In the ideal detective story the reader is given all
the clues yet fails to spot the criminal. He may advert to each clue
as it arises. He needs no further clues to solve the mystery. Yet he
can remain in the dark for the simple reason that reaching the
solution is not the mere apprehension of any clue, not the mere
memory of all, but a quite distinct activity of organising
intelligence that places the full set of clues in a unique
explanatory perspective.
By insight, then, is meant not any act of attention or advertence
or memory, but the supervening act of understanding. It is not any
recondite intuition but the familiar event that occures easily and
frequently in the moderately intelligent, rarely and with diffuculty
only in the very stupid. In itself it is so simple and obvious that
it seems to merit the little attention that commonly it receives. At
the same time, its function in cognitional activity is so central
that to grasp it in its conditions, its working, and its results, is
to confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole field of human
inquiry and human opinion. Indeed, this very wealth of implications
is disconcerting, and I find it difficult to state in any brief and
easy manner what the present book is about, how a single author can
expect to treat the variety of topics listed in the table of
contents, why he should attempt to do so in a single work, and what
good he could hope to accomplish even if he were to succeed in his
odd undertaking.
Still, a preface should provide at least a jejune and simplified
answer to such questions and, perhaps, I can make a beginning by
saying that the aim of the work is to convey an insight into insight.
Mathematicians seek insight into sets of elements. Scientists seek
insight into ranges of phenomena. Men of common sense seek insight
into concrete situations and practical affairs. But our concern is to
reach the act of organising intelligence that brings within a single
perspective the insights of mathematicians, scientists and men of
common sense.
It follows at once that the topics listed in the table of contents
are not so disparate as they appear on a superficial reading. If
anyone wishes to become a mathematician or a scientist or a man of
common sense, he will derive no direct help from the present work. As
physicsts study the shape of waves and leave to chemists the analysis
of air and water, so we are concerned not with the objects understood
in mathematics but with mathematicians' acts of understanding, not
with objects understood in the various sciences but with scientists'
acts of understanding, not with the concrete situations mastered by
common sense but with the acts of understanding of men of common
sense.
Further, while all acts of understanding have a certain family
likeness, a full and balanced view is to be reached only by combining
in a single account the evidence obtained from different fields of
intelligent activity. Thus, the precise nature of the act of
understanding is to be seen most clearly in mathematical examples.
The dynamic context in which understanding occures can be studied to
best advantage in an investigation of scientific methods. The
disturbance of that dynamic context by alien concerns is thrust upon
one's attention by the manner in which various measures of common
nonsense blend in with common sense.
However, insight is not only a mental activity but also a
constituent factor in human knowledge. It follows that insight into
insight is in some sense knowledge of knowledge. Indeed, it is a
knowledge of knowledge that seems extremely relevant to a whole
series of basic problmes in philosophy. This I must now endeavour to
indicate even though I can do so only in the abrupt and summary
fashion that leaves terms undefined and offers arguments that fall
far short of proof.
First, then, it is insight that makes the difference between the
tantalising problem and the evident solution. Accordingly, insights
seem to be the source of what Descartes named clear and distinct
ideas and, on that showing, insight into insight would be the source
of clear and distinct ideas about clear and distinct ideas.